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Well, someone is paying attention...

And in the Washington Post
Foreign Policy
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Problems with qualitative approaches
Tetlock: Experts typically do about as well as a “dart-throwing
chimp”
Except for television pundits, who do even worse. As did pretty
much every political expert prior to the 2016 and 2020 US
presidential elections.
The media want things to be dramatic. “We’re all going to die!
Details at 10!!!”
Qualitative theory isn’t much better:
Remember the hegemonic US seizure of undefended Canadian
and Mexican oil fields in response to the 1973 OPEC oil
embargo?
Neither do I.
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SMEs and the “narrative fallacy”
SME = “subject matter expert”
Hegel: the owl of Minerva flies only at dusk
Taleb (Black Swan): seeking out narratives is an almost
unavoidable cognitive function and it generates a dopamine hit
Tetlock (Good Judgement Project): prior knowledge as a SME
contributes only 2% to improved forecasting accuracy
This is your brain on narratives
Problems with quantitative approaches
Ward, Greenhill and Bakke (2010): Models based on
significance tests don’t predict well because that is not what a
significance test is supposed to do.
Gill, Jeff. 1999. The Insignificance of Null Hypothesis
Significance Testing. Political Research Quarterly 52:3, 647-674.
Frequentism is logically inconsistent and has been characterized
in Meehl (1978) as “a terrible mistake, basically unsound, poor
scientific strategy, and one of the worst things that ever
happened in the history of psychology”
I Hey, dude, tell us what you really think. . .
I But that is another lecture. . .
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Kahneman et al: people are really bad at statistical
reasoning
I Everyone, including statisticians unless they focus very
hard
I Example: managed mutual funds, which both theory and
evidence indicate cannot work (and thus are rapidly
disappearing)
I Example: opposition to “evidence based medicine” in the
US, with a preference for clinical intuition even when this
has been demonstrated to be less effective
I Probabilitistic weather forecasts seem to be the one major
exception: rain likelihood, hurricane tracks
The Necessity of Prediction in Policy
Feedforward: policy choices must be made in the present for
outcomes which may not occur for many years
Planning Times: even responses to current conditions may
require lead times of weeks or months
Wayne Gretzky Principle: You skate to where the puck is going
to be, not where it is.
[Side note: Working with alternative realities, unless these are
universally shared (very rare), isn’t very useful. But you knew
that.]
Good Judgment Project (Tetlock, Meller et al)
I Evaluated about 2000 forecasts, typically with a 6 to 12
month window, across a wide variety political and
economic domains
I Most forecasters—about 90%—were simply “dart-throwing
chimps”
I “Superforecasters”, however, consistently were about 80%
to 85% accurate, similar to that of the PITF and ICEWS
models. This held across multiple years: unlike managed
mutual funds, it did not regress to the mean
I Teams of superforecasters were more effective than
individuals, and behaved differently than random teams
I Superforecasters have distinct psychological profiles: “foxes
rather than hedgehogs”
I Prediction markets, SMEs and ensemble models provided
only marginal improvements
Factors encouraging technical political forecasting
I Conspicuous failures of existing methods: end of Cold War,
post-invasion Iraq, Arab spring
I Success of forecasting models in other behavioral domains
I Macroeconomic forecasting [maybe...]
I Elections prior to about 2015: Nate Silver effect
I Demographic and epidemiological forecasting
I Famine forecasting: USAID FEWS model
I Example: statistical models for mortgage repayment were
quite accurate
I Technological imperatives
I Increased processing capacity
I Increased variety of predictive models, all open source
I Information available on the web
I Decision-makers now expect visual displays of analytical
information, which in turn requires systematic
measurement
I “They won’t read things any more”
This must be important: it’s in The Economist !
And The Chronicle!
The Forecaster’s Quartet
I Nassem Nicholas Taleb. The Black Swan
(most entertaining obnoxious)
I Daniel Kahneman. Thinking Fast and Slow
(30 years of research which won Nobel Prize)
I Philip Tetlock. Expert Political Judgment
Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction
(Tetlock and Dan Gardner) (most directly relevant)
I Nate Silver. The Signal and the Noise
(high level of credibility after perfect 2012 electoral vote
predictions but most examples are not election forecasts.
E.g. major shout-out to Moneyball)
Past Large Scale Conflict Forecasting Projects
I State Failures Project 1994-2001
I Joint Warfare Analysis Center 1997
I FEWER [Davies and Gurr 1998]
I Center for Army Analysis 2002-2005
I Swiss Peace Foundation FAST 2000-2008
I Political Instability Task Force 2002-present
I DARPA ICEWS 2007-2015
I IARPA ACE and OSI ca 2015
I Peace Research Center Oslo (PRIO) and Uppsala
University UCDP models
I US Holocaust Memorial Museum Prediction Poll
Forecasting Projects
Other policy-oriented group who have presented models in






Presumably there are others, some classified. At the nation-year
level at least, this is seen as an existing technology that can be
customized.
Political Instability Task Force
I US government, multi-agency: 1995-present
I Statistical modeling of various forms of state-level
instability
I Forecasting models actively used since about 2005
I Two year probability forecasts with roughly 80% accuracy
(AUC)
I Predominantly logistic models with a simple “standard
PITF”set of variables; shifting to Bayesian approaches
I (PITF has accumulated a set of 2700 variables but only a
small number end up being important predictors)
PITF Variables
Two-year time horizon tends to favor structural variables Source:
Ben Valentino and Chad Hazlett, “Forecasting Non-state Mass Killings”, October
2012
PITF Results, ca. 2005
Source: Amer J of Pol Sci Vol 54, no. 1, Jan 2010 pg. 190
Dynamic Global Conflict Risk Index: European
Commission
ViEWS: Uppsala University and Peace Research
Institute, Oslo
ViEWS: Monthly forecasts
ViEWS: PRIO-GRID resolution for Africa
Convergent Results from Forecasting Projects-1
I Most models require only a [very] small number of variables
I Indirect indicators—famously, infant mortality rate as an
indicator of development—are very useful
I Temporal autoregressive effects are huge: the challenge is
predicting onsets and cessations, not continuations
I Spatial autoregressive effects—“bad neighborhoods”—are also
huge
I Multiple modeling approaches generally converge to similar
accuracy
Convergent Results from Forecasting Projects-2
I 80% to 85% accuracy—in the sense of AUC around 0.8—in the 6
to 24 month forecasting window occurs with remarkable
consistency: few if any replicable models exceed this, and models
below that level can usually be improved
I Measurement error on many of the dependent variables—for
example casualties, coup attempts—is still very large
I Forecast accuracy does not decline very rapidly with increased
forecast windows, suggesting long term structural factors rather
than short-term “triggers” are dominant. Trigger models more
generally do poorly except as post hoc “explanations.”
Simple models are good!
Recent study on predicting criminal recidivism showed
equivalent results could be obtained from
I A proprietary 137-variable black-box system costing
$22,000 a year
I Humans recruited from Mechanical Turk and provided with
7 variables
I A two-variable statistical regression model
For this problem, there is a widely-recognized “speed limit” on
predictive accuracy of around 70% and, as with conflict
forecasting, multiple methods can achieve this.
Source: Science 359:6373 19 Jan 2018, pg. 263; the original research is
reported in Science Advances 10.1126/sciadv.aao5580 (2018)
Conjecture
For the possibly first time in history, we may be entering an era
when foreign policy can be based on relatively accurate
projections of the future rather than random guesses and
ideology
“Possibly” since the superforecaster approach may have been
independently discovered earlier, for example in Confucian and
Venetian bureaucracies. Properly done, aggregates of weak
forecasts can be used to provide strong forecasts: ”boosting”
algorithms in machine learning demonstrate this systematically.
Three other cases where expensive “professional” advice has
been random or worse
I Medicine prior to sometime in the 20th century
I Managed mutual funds







I Now funded by PITF so probably stable for the near future
I Data released on Dataverse and covers 1996-present with
weekly updates
I Government version includes source texts
I Raytheon/BBN [proprietary] Serif/ACCENT coder
I Global coverage but events are still disproportionately from
Asia (PITF is working to correct this)
I BBN has extensively refined the CAMEO specification and
coding manual is on Dataverse
I Includes very extensive actor dictionaries but not verb
dictionaries
I Geolocated, though with quite a few errors
Location: ACLED Geospatial
Location: UCDP Geospatial
Conjecture: Sub-state, sub-annual models are the future
The problem of predicting at the nation-year level has
essentially been solved: it is straightforward to construct
models which hit the “speed limit” of 75% to 85% accuracy.
Sub-state and sub-annual predictions are both a new challenge
and more relevant to contemporary policy: this is seen
explicitly in ViEWS and GCRI is also moving in this direction.
At the nation-year level, there was a good alignment between
ends and means: states tend to change policies slowly, and
annualized state-level data is very common. But that was
then. . .
Changing nature of conflict: 1910
I “Gunboat diplomacy” was an accepted norm, as were
elements of bellicism and social Darwinism
I Some competition occurred between approximate equals
I Mediation was ad hoc with no established international
institutions
I Territorial change was credible and borders were extremely
important
I Military actors are almost exclusively states
Changing nature of conflict: 2020
I Highly asymmetric distribution of military power, though if
the recent drone vs. armor results of Turkey against Syria
and Azerbaijan against Armenia generalize, we may be on
the verge of several heretofore stable international conflicts
becoming unstable.
I Threats get almost immediate attention from potential
mediators, including the UN
I Non-military sanctions are credible (South Africa under
apartheid, Libya, Iraq, Iran, maybe Russia)
I Territorial changes are rare and highly problematic; in
conflict areas, national borders are at best completely
irrelevant, and at worst exacerbate conflict
I Non-state actors can exercise substantial military force
Sub-state and sub-annual data possibilities
I I’m obviously biased, but it is hard to imagine that event
data produced by fully automated coding—easily resolved
to within a day or so, and to a location and/or a specific
actor—is not going to be important. However, existing
systems use technology that has not been updated with the
radical improvements in natural language processing of the
past five years.
I Remote sensing data data is now widely available (along
with open source software for processing it) and becoming
less expensive
I The ACLED and ECOWAS model of local networks
[discretely] reporting to IGOs may also become important,
as is “cell phone journalism.”
Some non-conflict, non-protest domains that could be
addressed with suitably broad event data
I Illiberal democratic transitions:
Turkey, Hungary, Poland, Hong Kong, maybe USA
I 21st century right-wing populist movements—Tea Party
(USA), Brexit (UK), Yellow vest (France)—vs. 1920s-30s
right-wing populism in Italy, Germany, Spain, UK, USA
I Diversionary hypotheses
I External: Countries take advantage of international crises
to escalate in other domains (1956: simultaneous occurrence
of Suez crisis and Soviet invasion of Hungary)
I Internal: Countries escalate in international relations to
distract from internal problems (Falklands/Malvinas 1982;
Russian annexation of Crimea 2014)
Event data would not be used exclusively here but would be a
useful and inexpensive (if already coded) supplement to other
measures such as opinion polling and economic data.
Machine learning
New opportunities from machine learning
I ML methods recently have been successful in a number of
“artificial intelligence” problems previously thought to be
unsolvable
I Most statistical models have already been extensively
explored, and in any case are not optimized for prediction
(Ward, Greenhill and Bakke 2010)
I The parameter spaces of many of these models are vastly
larger than those of statistical models
I ML models generally work well with heterogeneous cases
I Most ML models are relatively insensitive to missing
values, or treat it as information
I Software is readily available and open source
Methods being used in ViEWS forecasting tournament
Risks in machine learning models
I Over-fitting
I It is not clear that political early warning has a sufficient
number of cases to take advantage of methods which
require large amounts of data
I ML models are generally atheoretical, and the rich
parameter spaces mean it is often difficult to impossible to
ascertain the relative importance of independent variables
I Some models—notably “deep learning”—are quite new and
may have features we don’t fully understand
I In many instances, ML models show only marginal
improvements over well-understood methods such as
logistic regression when applied across a wide set of
out-of-sample problems
And from nearby in the CACM
The very finite set of widely used ML methods
I Support vector machines
I Clustering, typically using k-means
I Random forests, a relatively recent ensemble variation on
the older method of decision trees
I Genetic algorithms
I Logistic regression, which not infrequently is
”embarrassingly effective”
I And. . .
And the monster in the living room:
recurrent neural networks (deep learning)
I These appear to be able to extract pretty much all
available signal in a set of data
I They are hugely computationally expensive but now
benefit from specialized hardware (“GPU”s) originally
developed for accurately rendering splattering zombie
brains in video games
I Neural networks have always been good at dealing with
missing data—which they treat as information—and
non-linear relationships
I Some variants are specifically designed to work with
sequences, others with two-dimensional data
I Methods of extracting key variables are less developed but
exist and can be developed
Weaknesses with respect to conflict forecasting
I We are dealing with rare positive cases (that is, conflicts),
even in very large data sets. Conflict outbreaks, as opposed
to continuations, are even rarer
I “Trigger sequences” may be a cognitive illusion, so
sequence-based methods will not provide advantages over
structural methods. Spatial relations, on the other hand,
are probably quite real.
I To date, random forests have been the more important
breakthrough than neural nets
Open source
Open source, open access, open collaboration
I There is a strong if incomplete norm towards open sharing
of data and methods
I Unintended consequence: PITF “forecasting tournament”
cannot be published in a major journal because it used
proprietary data—the baseline data has 2,700
variables—that cannot be archived in replication sets. The
results are, however, still available on SSRN.
I The inability to share source texts is clearly a concern in
news-report-based datasets such as ICEWS and MID,
though URLs can be shared.
I By all available evidence, US government forecasting
projects are using similar methodologies to those available
in open sources; in fact they are increasing lagging behind
Europe on this
I We now have significant NGO and academic work, and an
international “epistemic community” has developed around
the topic.

Open versus proprietary software
I’m not exactly a neutral observer on this issue. . .
I The open source environment for both natural language
processing and event coding is now extraordinarily rich and
largely has standardized on the Python programming
language. It is thoroughly international.
I Open source software is nonetheless only “free as in
puppy:” very substantial investment of labor is required to
effectively use a complex open source system
I Continued maintenance and documentation of an open
source system depends on the development of a large user
community: there are serious network effects in operation
I Many academic incentive structures are not aligned with
the production of quality open source systems
Similar issues in. . . astrophysics
Can’t resist sharing this...
dinosource
Astrophysics phrase for poorly documented laboratory software
written on the assumption it would only be used for a couple
years but still in use, typically endlessly patched, and by
multiple projects, two or three decades later.
Issues for astrophysics software relevant to event data
used in forecasting models
I Open access to source code is essential for scientific
progress and integrity: “secretly developed codes are of no
help to the community and produce unverifiable results.”
I Not doing well here: Cline Center, TERRIER and Phoenix
are coded with open PETRARCH-2 but the more widely
used ICEWS and GDELT use secret coding engines
I Open standards for interchange of program parameters
I Reasonably okay: ICEWS actor dictionaries are open if
odd; TABARI/PETRARCH family is a de facto standard
I Modularized—LEGO blocks—components
I Doing very well here with modular formatters, parsers,
coders, geolocation, pipelines
I Core components need to be available that have been
written and documented to industry standards, not
laboratory standards
I Still needs work: PETRARCH family has very poor
documentation; TABARI/JABARI and Serif/ACCENT had
professional programming, though only TABARI is open
Additional issues
I Many new models have numerous hyperparameters which
are often set in rather ad hoc fashions (or, at best,
optimized for a specific set of data)
I In rare events analysis, continuity is critical: we need to be
able to generate comparable data across many years and
many different projects
I There is increasing concern about assessing the implicit
biases in models
I We owe transparency to the people who actually are
funding us, whether directly through taxes or indirectly
through the extortionate oligopoly profits accruing to
foundations and philanthropists
Academics: remember that publishing in paywalled journals is
equivalent to burying your work beneath a pile of radioactive
sludge in Antarctica
The software singularity
I Code for doing almost anything is now available for free
and has an effective support community on Stack Overflow:
things that once took months now can be done in hours
I newspaper3k downloads, formats and updates news
scrapping in 20 lines of Python
I universal dependency parses provide about 90% of the
information required for event coding
I easily deployed data visualization dashboards are now too
numerous to track
I This enables development to be done very rapidly with
small decentralized ”remote” teams rather than the old
model of large programming shops
I In the software development community in Charlottesville,
our CTO group focuses on this as the single greatest
current opportunity, and doing it correctly is the single
greatest challenge
That other singularity?: no, sentient killer robots are not about
to take over the world, and you’re going to die someday. Sorry.
CHALLENGES
Theory: what can and cannot be
predicted?
Is astronomy scientific?
Astronomy generally has a very good record of prediction, and
from the earliest days of astronomy, successful prediction has
been a key legitimating factor




I precision steering of space-craft
Nonetheless, astronomy cannot predict, nor does it attempt to
predict:
I solar flares, despite their potentially huge economic
consequences
I previously unseen comets
I next nearby supernova: when will we see the end of the
410-year supernova peace?
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Determinism: The Pioneer spacecraft anomaly
“[Following 30 years of observations] When all known forces
acting on the spacecraft are taken into consideration, a very
small but unexplained force remains. It appears to cause a
constant sunward acceleration of (8.74 ± 1.33) × 10−10m/s2 for
both spacecraft.”
Source: Wikipedia
Irreducible sources of error-1
I Specification error: no model of a complex, open system
can contain all of the relevant variables;
I Measurement error: with very few exceptions, variables will
contain some measurement error
I presupposing there is even agreement on what the “correct”
measurement is in an ideal setting;
I Predictive accuracy is limited by the square root of
measurement error: in a bivariate model if your reliability is
80%, your accuracy can’t be more than 90%
I This biases the coefficient estimates as well as the
predictions
I Quasi-random structural error: Complex and chaotic
deterministic systems behave as if they were random under
at least some parameter combinations .




Irreducible sources of error-2
I Rational randomness such as that predicted by mixed
strategies in zero-sum games
I Effective policy response:
in at least some instances organizations will have taken
steps to head off a crisis that would have otherwise
occurred.
I The effects of natural phenomenon
I the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami dramatically reduced
violence in the long-running conflict in Aceh
I Arational randomness attributable to free-will
I Rule-of-thumb from our rat-running colleagues:
“A genetically standardized experimental animal, subjected
to carefully controlled stimuli in a laboratory setting, will
do whatever it wants.”
(Tetlock (2013) independently has an almost identical list of the
irreducible sources of error.)
Hey, I’m no rat! What about free will?!?
This is relevant to individual behavior but is constrained in
political—and economic—behavior
I while individuals can change, most of the time they don’t
I most politically significant actions involve collective action
I forecasting models predict aggregates, not individual events
While the individual man is an insoluble puzzle, in the aggregate he
becomes a mathematical certainty. You can, for example, never
foretell what any one man will do, but you can say with precision what
an average number will be up to. Individuals vary, but percentages
remain constant.
Sherlock Holmes in The Sign of the Four, chapter 10 (1890)
That said, if Tetlock is correct that 95% of the population are
dart-throwing chimps, for them political behavior is unpredictable.
Balancing factors which make behavior predictable
I Individual preferences and expectations, which tend to
change very slowly
I Organizational and bureaucratic rules and norms
I Constraints of mass mobilization strategies
I Structural constraints:
the Maldives will not respond to climate-induced sea level
rise by building a naval fleet to conquer Singapore.
I Choices and strategies at Nash equilibrium points
I Autoregression (more a result than a cause)
I Network and contagion effects (same)
“History doesn’t repeat itself but it rhymes”
Mark Twain (also occasionally attributed to Friedrich
Nietzsche)
Paradox of political prediction
Political behaviors are generally highly incremental and vary
little from day to day, or even century to century (Putnam).
Nonetheless, we perceive politics as very unpredictable because
we focus on the unexpected (Kahneman).
Consequently the only “interesting” forecasts are those which
are least characteristic of the system as a whole. However, only
some of those changes are actually predictable.
Finding a non-trivial forecast
I Too frequent: prediction is obvious without technical
assistance
I Too rare: prediction may be correct, but the event is so
infrequent that
I The prediction is irrelevant to policy
I Calibration can be very tricky
I Accuracy of the model is difficult to assess
I “Just right”: these are situations where typical human
accuracy is likely to be flawed, and consequently these
could have a high payoff, but there are not very many of
them.
Black swans
Ideal forecasting targets are neither too common nor too rare
Black swan: Irene Country Lodge, 19 May 2014
The Forecasting Zoo
Ducks can be interesting...
And this is going too far. . .
DARPA-World!
By definition, most black swans will not occur ! So there is little point
in investing a large amount of effort trying to predict them.
“Can your model predict a chemical attack by self-recruited Mexican
jihadis working as rodeo clowns in Evanston, Wyoming? Why not?!”
Challenge: distinguishing black swans from rare events
Black swan: an event that has a low probability even
conditional on other variables
Rare event: an event that occurs infrequently, but conditional
on an appropriate set of variables, does not have a low
probability
Medical analogy: certain rare forms of cancer appear to be
highly correlated with specific rare genetic mutations.
Conditioned on those mutations, they are not black swans.
Another important category: high probability events which are
ignored. The “sub-prime mortgage crisis” was the result of the
failure of a large number of mortgage which models had
completely accurately identified as “sub-prime” and thus likely
to fail. This was not a low probability event.
Upton Sinclair: It is hard to persuade someone to believe
something when he can make a great deal of money not
believing it.
Briefly, a few more challenges. . .
Models matter
Arab Spring is an unprecedented product of the new social
media
I Model used by Chinese censors of NSM: King, Peng,
Roberts 2012
I Next likely candidates: Africa
Arab Spring is an example of an instability contagion/diffusion
process
I Eastern Europe 1989-1991, OECD 1968, CSA 1859-1861,
Europe 1848, Latin America 1820-1828
I Next likely candidates: Central Asia
Arab Spring is a black swan
I There is no point in modeling black swans, you instead
build systems robust against them
Are trigger models simply a cognitive illusion?
I Human experts assert they are basing predictions on
trigger sequences but is may simply be an artifact of the
dominance of episodic associative memory (Kahneman)
I To date, statistical studies have not found that detailed
event-based models provide a predictive advantages over
structural models at the 6 to 24 month horizon
I Event data can substitute for structural data, so it
necessarily contains meaningful information. But it doesn’t
appear to contain additional information.
I However, this is using traditional aggregated linear time
series models: sequence-based methods might do better
Data quality is more important than quantity
I We have apparently passed the ”inversion” where more
information on the web is computer-generated than
human-generated. Some of it is harmless; much of it is not
I The social media platforms clearly will not police
themselves: anger, greed and delusion are their business
model
I Various event data issues that need to be seriously
addressed
I False positive rates
I Duplication rates
I Urban and other geographical/socioeconomic biases
I ”Media fatigue,” particularly in conflict zones
I Biases in existing event data sets primarily focusing on
violent conflict
Making this relevant to the policy community
This is a two-way street.
I The conflict policy community needs to become as
sophisticated in evaluating and integrating quantitative
models as their counterparts are in economics and public
health.
I Academic researchers need to focus on questions and
methods relevant to policy and not just “interesting.”
And/or easy to study. And/or publishable after a five-year
lag. And/or accessible only on a publisher’s web site for a
$40 per article fee.
I Both sides need to work on common standards for
evaluating the quantity and robustness of results.
I Both sides need to understand the vocabularies, incentives
and cultures of the other.
Ethical concerns
I Thus far, we’ve generally had the luxury of no one paying
attention to any of our predictions : what if governments
do start paying attention?
I “Policy relevant forecast interval” is around 6 to 24 months
I USAID/FAO famine forecasting model
I It is possible that our models could become less accurate
because crises are being averted, but I don’t see that
happening any time soon.
I Difficulties in getting anyone, including experts (see
Kahneman, Tetlock), to correctly interpret probabilistic
forecasts
I Possible impact on sources
I Local collaborators
I Journalists (cf. Mexico)
I NGOs to the extent we are using their information
Final thoughts
400 Years Ago: Francis Bacon establishes principles of
modern science
New Method (Novum Organum) [1620]
I Scientific method based on the primacy of observation and
induction
I Science should be open, in contrast to the secrecy of the
alchemists
I Science should benefit society as a whole—also a contrast
to the alchemists—and is deserving of state support
I We should not have “one data set or model to rule them
all”
I Follow the approach of hurricane and snowstorm
forecasters who triangulate results of multiple
independently developed data sets and models which have
different assumptions and strengths
“What would this look like if it were easy?”—Tim Ferris
Table: Cost to put one person in Earth orbit, 2019 $US-millions
Project Development Per-person cost
NASA Space Shuttle $27,400 $170
NASA Orion (projected) $23,600 $291
SpaceX CrewDragon $ 1,700 $ 55
Economist, 4 June 2020
Possibly apochryphal:
Around 2014, Google assessed the performance of deep neural
networks combined with word embeddings in machine
translation projects, and decided to discard 500,000 lines of
hand-crafted code developed over a decade, replacing this with






Links to data and software: http://philipschrodt.org
Blog: http://asecondmouse.org
